Sunday, March 30, 2008

Comrade Chandrashekhar: Representative of the Spirit of the Student Movement


(On the occasion of 31 March, Chandrashekhar’s 11th martyrdom anniversary, Kavita Krishnan situates Chandrashekhar’s legacy in the context of contemporary debates and assessments of the Indian student movement. – Ed/)

“In our freedom struggle we have seen how students came out of the universities in large numbers. They should come out because in certain ways we are privileged. We come to universities, educate ourselves, gain knowledge, get to know the world, are better equipped to understand and analyse our realities. So it is our responsibility to disseminate this knowledge. Whatever we have taken from society, we must give it back.”
- Comrade Chandrashekhar, in an interview

Chandrashekhar was both a product and an architect of the student movement of his times. The richness of the insights and experiences he imparted to the student movement of the 90s was generated by the heritage of past generations of revolutionary student movements. Chandrashekhar saw a living link between the student movement of the 90s and the AISF of the freedom struggle. For Chandrashekhar, Bhagat Singh was no icon for worship; he was a challenge calling to be fulfilled. And it is not difficult to trace the running thread that linked Bhagat Singh martyred at the hands of the British; the hundreds of students and youth inspired by Naxalbari, gunned down on the streets of West Bengal in the early 70s; and Chandrashekhar who was shot dead in Siwan.


And yet, the decade of the 90s, to begin with, seemed very far away from the mood of the high-points of the Left and democratic student movements of the past. It was heralded as a decade of triumph by the neo-liberal intelligentsia, media and ruling class. Triumph over communism (in the wake of the Soviet collapse and discrediting of communist China among youth after the Tiananmen massacre); the triumph of all-out ‘globalisation’ as dictated by the IMF-World Bank. In the early years of the 90s, most commentators in the media completely discounted the Left as a force with any appeal among students. The only two trends of student stirrings, according to such opinions, were either the anti-Mandal frenzy, or the fanaticism of the Hindutva variety. The dominant left mood itself was one of capitulation; of demoralisation over the Soviet collapse; of suppressing its own identity in order to back the so-called ‘social justice’ ruling class formations in North India. This mood was hardly one that could ignite any appeal in the minds of students. Chandrashekhar is an enduring symbol of a creative radical student movement that disproved all those myths and struck strong roots in the hearts and minds of students of the Hindi heartland at precisely that time.

Chandrashekhar, already an activist and a Bihar state leader of the AISF, was dissatisfied with the AISF’s defeatism and its surrender to the ruling class options as the only alternative, in the name of secularism and social justice. He sought a platform that would directly evolve a creative Left language with which to confront and challenge the discourse and forces of right-wing economics and politics. Like many others of his generation, he found AISA as an answer to that quest.

AISA was boldly willing to confront communal forces both ideologically and politically, quite directly. Challenging the ruling classes who were consigning youth to the flames of anti-reservation passions, AISA from its very birth defended the Mandal recommendations of reservations for OBCs in education and jobs. At the same time, AISA mobilised students to demand education and employment as against job cuts and privatisation of education. The latter policies were not only undermining the potential of the Mandal recommendations; the extreme insecurity caused by shrinking educational and job opportunities were creating fertile ground for anti-quota prejudices to be sown.

The CPI(ML) in Bihar and UP was not willing to hand over the task of defending secularism and social justice to the likes of Laloo and Mulayam, and AISA was determined to emerge as a Left student force with a strong mass following among students. AISA, in contrast to many of the ML or Left-of-CPI(M) groups, did not accept cliquishness and sectarianism as the inevitable fate of radicalism in student politics. Rather, AISA was determined to reach out to every democratic impulse, every fighting voice in society.

It was these qualities in AISA which drew Chandrashekhar along with many others towards it. And it was this character that Chandrashekhar himself enhanced immensely through his own initiatives. Like Bhagat Singh, like the student martyrs of the Naxalbari, who left prestigious colleges to join the revolutionary struggles of poor peasantry, Chandu, in his life, as well as his death, broke the barriers between academics, student activism and peoples’ struggles beyond the campus: the struggles of the people of Bhojpur, the resistance of the tribals of the Narmada valley, the blood spilt by the police in the Uttarakhand movement at Muzaffarnagar, the lives of the people of Siwan… He forged bonds of solidarity, life and death with all these struggles.

AISA’s successful victory in the campuses of BHU, Allahabad University, Kumaon University and JNU, defeating the ABVP head-on, was precisely because it was able to light the spark of Left radicalism in students, offering a bold ray of hope in those testing times. The ‘official’ Left groups - CPI(M)-affiliated SFI in particular - could not grasp the reasons for the appeal of AISA in the Hindi belt where SFI could make no headway, neither for AISA’s appeal in SFI’s bastion in JNU. In fact, a National President of the SFI, writing in the PD just after Chandrashekhar’s tenure as JNUSU President and prior to his martyrdom, had derided and dismissed Chandrashekhar’s “so-called revolutionary activities in the grassroots”.

Comrade Shyam Narain Yadav, martyred along with Chandrashekhar, had been an SFI leader and had joined the CPI(ML) along with 30 other SFI members. What led young revolutionaries like Chandrashekhar and Shyam Narain to look beyond the confines of the ‘official’ communist parties? What accounts for the appeal of AISA in the 90s and for its renewed appeal in the present phase? These are questions that the CPI(M) is unable to answer.

Contrast the living, inspiring reality of Chandrashekhar’s legacy with the text of a recent CPI(M) document on the student movement. This document, titled ‘Student Front: Policy And Tasks’ and adopted at the March 31 to April 02, 2007 meeting of the CPI(M) Central Committee, is full of distortions and silences regarding important chapters and questions of the Indian student movement.

Writing of the 1960s and 70s, the document says, “In the seventies, the dominant trend in the student movement was against corruption and authoritarian political tendencies, which culminated in the emergency….During this period, since the mid-sixties various shades of ultra Left tendencies also arose amongst the students. Seeking to divorce the student movement from the general democratic movement, advancing the slogan of “student power”, such forces strengthened anarchic trends disrupting and weakening the united student movement.”

The Naxalbari movement of 1967 unleashed a wave of revolt amongst students. The timing coincided with the ‘New Left’-type trends of the late 60s in the West; but the pro-Naxalbari trend amongst students was very distinct and different from any romanticised slogan of ‘student power’. Far from being a bid for ‘student power’, the Naxalbari movement was marked by masses of students leaving prestigious campuses to join the peasants’ struggle in the countryside. It was the peasants’ revolutionary bid for power, betrayed by the CPI(M), that students all over the country came out to support. It was these students who bore the brunt of the ‘white terror’ of the early 70s, and were the heroic martyrs killed in cold blood on the streets and police stations of Kolkata. Rather than being out of tune with the mood for democracy, they were at the forefront of the struggle against the authoritarianism of the early 70s that was a rehearsal for the emergency. Gorakh Pandey’s lines from Khooni Panja about the Congress’ regime of repression captures this reality: “Sattar mein kasa kalkatte par, kuch jawan umangon ke natey/Kas gaya mulk ke gardan par, pachhattar ke atey atey…” (The bloody hand gripped Calcutta in 1970, to crush some young dreams/Its grip tightened on the nation’s neck by 1975).

The CPI(M) document also fails to locate the roots of the phenomenon of anarchy and violence in North Indian campuses. It says, “The outside environment of criminalisation of politics and antisocial activities impacts on the campuses. This violence also affects the democratic rights of the students and in most of the campuses, students union elections are not being held for a very long period.” Elsewhere it says, “The legitimacy of the demand for holding students union election also stands questioned due to the growing violence which takes place around them.” The CPI(M) thus blames the bans on student union polls on anarchy, lawlessness and violence, and tacitly legitimizes the ruling class justification for such bans. This is because the CPI(M) is unwilling to confront the fact that ‘anarchy’ and ‘lawlessness’ is not something restricted to student politics; rather it is enmeshed in the commercialized and corrupt culture of college and university administrations and their political masters. The bans on student politics are not so much a response to campus violence but are intended to crush the potential for student movements against fee hikes, privatization and other anti-student policies; and the bans on student politics in turn foster anarchy. The CPI(M) document, like SFI’s practice in North India, completely fails to recognize this and therefore depoliticises the issue of bans on student unions. It is AISA which, in the campuses of Bihar and UP, has posed a challenge to anarchy and lawlessness by offering a popular platform of a student movement demanding campus democracy.

The CPI(M) document mentions “a new challenge” in today’s times: “The blind opposition to the state is acting as a complement to neo-liberal offensive against the state. This is leading to broad anti-Left umbrella platforms emerging where they extreme Left and the extreme Right cohabit. This also compounds the problem of depoliticisation.” This theorization, on the face of it, appears strange. Where on earth does the CPI(M) find extreme right student groups displaying any ‘blind opposition to the state’?! Don’t all right-wing groups like NSUI and ABVP create consent for the state? But the accusation that ‘extreme right and extreme left cohabit’ gives us a clue to what the CPI(M) is implying. The accusation of ‘a ultra-left and right mahajot’ is a familiar one leveled by the CPI(M) both in West Bengal and in JNU too, where the CPI(M) policies are increasingly discredited in the wake of Singur and Nandigram and the SFI has suffered electoral reverses, and in the case of JNU, total rout in the Central Panel. All those on the Left who oppose the CPI(M)’s support for corporate land grab are branded as ‘blind opponents’ of the state, of development and progress; as ‘anarchists’; as promoters of ‘depoliticisation’.

The real live political impulses of students - be it their response to the call of Naxalbari or their rallying with the protesting peasants of Singur and Nandigram, Kalinganagar and Khammam, the same impulses that Chandrashekhar best represented - are a direct refutation of the CPI(M)’s feeble attempts to wash the enduring and continuing legacy of Naxalbari out of the history of the Indian student movement.

Saturday, March 29, 2008

End the siege of Gaza!


International Solidarity Action

31 March - 1 April

End the world complicity to the Israeli occupation and crimes against the
Palestinian people!

A group of international participants decided to act against our
countries' complicity to the inhumane and devastating siege of the Gaza
Strip.

A delegation including participants from the Basque country, Austria,
Scotland, Norway, Italy, Netherlands, France, Spain, Greece, Turkey,
Palestine, Jordan and India intend to reach the Egyptian side of the
border with Gaza in order to deliver a truckload of food and medicine and
in protest against the inhuman siege imposed on the people of Gaza, with
the complicity of our own governments.

We protest against the genocide of the Palestinian people and condemn the
hypocrisy of European and other governments who blatantly violate the
democratic will of the Palestinian people and have taken positions in the
interest of the Israeli and US agenda of occupation and domination.

We strongly condemn the European Union for backtracking on their
responsibility, as stipulated in past agreements, to facilitate and
oversee the flow of people through the Rafah border crossing.
The European governments are therefore directly complicit in the
Israeli-imposed siege of the Palestinian population of Gaza, their
confinement to an open air prison and denial of access to the most basic
goods and services, resulting in massive suffering and a humanitarian
disaster.

Our protest must also be seen in the light of the 60th anniversary of the
1948 Nakba -the massive expulsion and forced flight of the Palestinian
people as a result of the Zionist aggression which paved the way for the
creation of the state of Israel- as well as the on-going Nakba and Israeli
occupation, marked by expansion policies, expropriation and bloodshed.

We emphasize the urgent need to enforce and broaden the global campaign
for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against the Israeli Apartheid
State and its policies of occupation and oppression.

Solidarity with the people of Palestine!!!
We call on everyone wishing to participate to join the delegation to Rafah!!!

* Departure from Cairo: Monday morning 31/03 at 5:00am from the Egyptian
Bar Association

* Return to Cairo: Monday night 31/03

* Information: +20 - 1 - 63 78 95 94

"European Campaign Against the Siege"
Anti-imperialist Camp
www.antiimperialista.org
camp@antiimperialista.org
************************************

Thursday, March 27, 2008

Twelve Suggestions for Dealing with the Tibetan Situation by Some Chinese

Below is the text of their open letter to Chinese government.

1. At present the one-sided propaganda of the official Chinese media is
having the effect of stirring up inter-ethnic animosity and aggravating an
already tense situation. This is extremely detrimental to the long-term goal
of safeguarding national unity. We call for such propaganda to be stopped.

2. We support the Dalai Lama’s appeal for peace, and hope that the ethnic
conflict can be dealt with according to the principles of goodwill, peace,
and non-violence. We condemn any violent act against innocent people,
strongly urge the Chinese government to stop the violent suppression, and
appeal to the Tibetan people likewise not to engage in violent activities.

3. The Chinese government claims that “there is sufficient evidence to prove
this incident was organized, premeditated, and meticulously orchestrated by
the Dalai clique.” We hope that the government will show proof of this. In
order to change the international community’s negative view and distrustful
attitude, we also suggest that the government invite the United Nation’s
Commission on Human Rights to carry out an independent investigation of the
evidence, the course of the incident, the number of casualties, etc.

4. In our opinion, such Cultural-Revolution-like language as “the Dalai Lama
is a jackal in Buddhist monk’s robes and an evil spirit with a human face
and the heart of a beast” used by the Chinese Communist Party leadership in
the Tibet Autonomous Region is of no help in easing the situation, nor is it
beneficial to the Chinese government’s image. As the Chinese government is
committed to integrating into the international community, we maintain that
it should display a style of governing that conforms to the standards of
modern civilization.

5. We note that on the very day when the violence erupted in Lhasa (March
14), the leaders of the Tibet Autonomous Region declared that “there is
sufficient evidence to prove this incident was organized, premeditated, and
meticulously orchestrated by the Dalai clique.” This shows that the
authorities in Tibet knew in advance that the riot would occur, yet did
nothing effective to prevent the incident from happening or escalating. If
there was a dereliction of duty, a serious investigation must be carried out
to determine this and deal with it accordingly.

6. If in the end it cannot be proved that this was an organized,
premeditated, and meticulously orchestrated event but was instead a ‘popular
revolt’ triggered by events, then the authorities should pursue those
responsible for inciting the popular revolt and concocting false information
to deceive the Central Government and the people; they should also seriously
reflect on what can be learned from this event so as to avoid taking the
same course in the future.

7. We strongly demand that the authorities not subject every Tibetan to
political investigation or revenge. The trials of those who have been
arrested must be carried out according to judicial procedures that are open,
just, and transparent so as to ensure that all parties are satisfied.

8. We urge the Chinese government to allow credible national and
international media to go into Tibetan areas to conduct independent
interviews and news reports. In our view, the current news blockade cannot
gain credit with the Chinese people or the international community, and is
harmful to the credibility of the Chinese government. If the government
grasps the true situation, it need not fear challenges. Only by adopting an
open attitude can we turn around the international community‚s distrust of
our government.

9. We appeal to the Chinese people and overseas Chinese to be calm and
tolerant, and to reflect deeply on what is happening. Adopting a posture of
aggressive nationalism will only invite antipathy from the international
community and harm China’s international image.

10. The disturbances in Tibet in the 1980s were limited to Lhasa, whereas
this time they have spread to many Tibetan areas. This deterioration
indicates that there are serious mistakes in the work that has been done
with regard to Tibet. The relevant government departments must
conscientiously reflect upon this matter, examine their failures, and
fundamentally change the failed nationality policies.

11. In order to prevent similar incidents from happening in future, the
government must abide by the freedom of religious belief and the freedom of
speech explicitly enshrined in the Chinese Constitution, thereby allowing
the Tibetan people fully to express their grievances and hopes, and
permitting citizens of all nationalities freely to criticize and make
suggestions regarding the government’s nationality policies.

12. We hold that we must eliminate animosity and bring about national
reconciliation, not continue to increase divisions between nationalities. A
country that wishes to avoid the partition of its territory must first avoid
divisions among its nationalities. Therefore, we appeal to the leaders of
our country to hold direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama. We hope that the
Chinese and Tibetan people will do away with the misunderstandings between
them, develop their interactions with each other, and achieve unity.
Government departments as much as popular organizations and religious
figures should make great efforts toward this goal.

Signatures:

Wang Lixiong (Beijing, Writer)
Liu Xiaobo (Beijing, Freelance Writer)
Zhang Zuhua (Beijing, scholar of constitutionalism)
Sha Yexin (Shanghai, writer, Chinese Muslim)
Yu Haocheng (Beijing, jurist)
Ding Zilin (Beijing, professor)
Jiang peikun (Beijing, professor)
Yu Jie (Beijing, writer)
Sun Wenguang (Shangdong, professor)
Ran Yunfei (Sichuan, editor, Tujia nationality)
Pu Zhiqiang (Beijing, lawyer)
Teng Biao (Beijing, Layer and scholar)
Liao Yiwu ()Sichuan, writer)
Wang Qisheng (Beijing, scholar)
Zhang Xianling (Beijing, engineer)
Xu Jue (Beijing, research fellow)
Li Jun (Gansu, photographer)
Gao Yu (Beijing, journalist)
Wang Debang (Beijing, freelance writer)
Zhao Dagong (Shenzhen, freelance writer)
Jiang Danwen (Shanghai, writer)
Liu Yi (Gansu, painter)
Xu Hui (Beijing, writer)
Wang Tiancheng (Beijing, scholar)
Wen kejian (Hangzhou, freelance)
Li Hai (Beijing, freelance writer)
Tian Yongde (Inner Mongolia, folk human rights activists)
Zan Aizong (Hangzhou, journalist)
Liu Yiming (Hubei, freelance writer)
Liu Di (Beijing, freelance writer)

Wednesday, March 26, 2008

Partying Like It’s 1929


By PAUL KRUGMAN

If Ben Bernanke manages to save the financial system from collapse, he will — rightly — be praised for his heroic efforts. But what we should be asking is: How did we get here? Why does the financial system need salvation? Why do mild-mannered economists have to become superheroes? The answer, at a fundamental level, is that we’re paying the price for willful amnesia. We chose to forget what happened in the 1930s — and having refused to learn from history, we’re repeating it. Contrary to popular belief, the stock market crash of 1929 wasn’t the defining moment of the Great Depression. What turned an ordinary recession into a civilization-threatening slump was the wave of bank runs that swept across America in 1930 and 1931. This banking crisis of the 1930s showed that unregulated, unsupervised financial markets can all too easily suffer catastrophic failure. As the decades passed, however, that lesson was forgotten — and now we’re relearning it, the hard way. To grasp the problem, you need to understand what banks do. Banks exist because they help reconcile the conflicting desires of savers and borrowers. Savers want freedom — access to their money on short notice. Borrowers want commitment: they don’t want to risk facing sudden demands for repayment. Normally, banks satisfy both desires: depositors have access to their funds whenever they want, yet most of the money placed in a bank’s care is used to make long-term loans. The reason this works is that withdrawals are usually more or less matched by new deposits, so that a bank only needs a modest cash reserve to make good on its promises. But sometimes — often based on nothing more than a rumor — banks face runs, in which many people try to withdraw their money at the same time. And a bank that faces a run by depositors, lacking the cash to meet their demands, may go bust even if the rumor was false. Worse yet, bank runs can be contagious. If depositors at one bank lose their money, depositors at other banks are likely to get nervous, too, setting off a chain reaction. And there can be wider economic effects: as the surviving banks try to raise cash by calling in loans, there can be a vicious circle in which bank runs cause a credit crunch, which leads to more business failures, which leads to more financial troubles at banks, and so on. That, in brief, is what happened in 1930-1931, making the Great Depression the disaster it was. So Congress tried to make sure it would never happen again by creating a system of regulations and guarantees that provided a safety net for the financial system. And we all lived happily for a while — but not for ever after. Wall Street chafed at regulations that limited risk, but also limited potential profits. And little by little it wriggled free — partly by persuading politicians to relax the rules, but mainly by creating a “shadow banking system” that relied on complex financial arrangements to bypass regulations designed to ensure that banking was safe. For example, in the old system, savers had federally insured deposits in tightly regulated savings banks, and banks used that money to make home loans. Over time, however, this was partly replaced by a system in which savers put their money in funds that bought asset-backed commercial paper from special investment vehicles that bought collateralized debt obligations created from securitized mortgages — with nary a regulator in sight. As the years went by, the shadow banking system took over more and more of the banking business, because the unregulated players in this system seemed to offer better deals than conventional banks. Meanwhile, those who worried about the fact that this brave new world of finance lacked a safety net were dismissed as hopelessly old-fashioned. In fact, however, we were partying like it was 1929 — and now it’s 1930. The financial crisis currently under way is basically an updated version of the wave of bank runs that swept the nation three generations ago. People aren’t pulling cash out of banks to put it in their mattresses — but they’re doing the modern equivalent, pulling their money out of the shadow banking system and putting it into Treasury bills. And the result, now as then, is a vicious circle of financial contraction. Mr. Bernanke and his colleagues at the Fed are doing all they can to end that vicious circle. We can only hope that they succeed. Otherwise, the next few years will be very unpleasant — not another Great Depression, hopefully, but surely the worst slump we’ve seen in decades. Even if Mr. Bernanke pulls it off, however, this is no way to run an economy. It’s time to relearn the lessons of the 1930s, and get the financial system back under control. *****(Published on March 21, 2008 in New York Times)

Tuesday, March 25, 2008

Tension in Tibet: Political dialogue only key to lasting solution

By Kavita Krishnan
In the wake of the anniversary of the 1959 Tibet movement (March 10) and ahead of the Beijing Olympics, Tibet has once again emerged as a hot spot of ethnic tension. There are reports of violence against and killing of protesting Tibetan monks by Chinese forces; and also of ethnic targeting of Han Chinese and Hui Muslims by Tibetan protesters. Chinese authorities have straightaway blamed the Dalai Lama for provoking the violent protests. The [Chinese] Army has been deployed after more than a week of escalating tension. While there is little ``independent'' information to judge the actual nature and scale of the turbulence within Tibet and attempts by the Chinese state to suppress it, solidarity protests are being witnessed in many centres across the world and Tibetan refugees based in India are particularly vocal against the recent turn of events in Tibet.

The turmoil in Tibet has been greeted by die-hard anti-China hawks with demands of boycott of the Beijing Olympics. In India, BJP and the likes of George Fernandes have raised an uproar in Parliament with their shrill anti-China hate campaign over Tibet.

The US has always used the Tibet question as part of its overall strategy of containing China and in the present instance too, it is entirely possible that Washington is looking for ways to embarrass China with a disruption of the Beijing Olympics.

The US Speaker Nancy Pelosi, appearing at a public gathering with the Dalai Lama in India, has recently said that people who failed to speak out against China and ``Chinese oppression'' would ``lose all moral authority to speak on human rights''. The storming of the Chinese Embassy in Delhi by Tibetan protesters on the same day as Pelosi's speech was surely no coincidence. For the US, in the month of March that marks five years of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq (years that have seen the public horror and shame of Abu Gharib), to claim ``moral authority'' on human rights is brazenly outrageous. Those who support the occupation of Palestine and continue to occupy Afghanistan and Iraq surely have no right to accuse other regimes of ``oppression'' or ``occupation''! Nationality struggles are faultlines that the US has exploited time and again to further its imperialist interests, Kosovo being a glaring example. Be it Tibet or Kashmir, the US is eager to manipulate the situation in order to strengthen its strategic foothold in Asia.

Also on the anvil is a visit by British premier Gordon Brown to the Dalai Lama in India. It is one thing for Tibetan refugees in India to have the right to protest; but it is highly reprehensible for India to allow its soil to be used to facilitate gross interference and proclamations by the imperialist US and its allies on internal matters of China.

India's response to the Tibet question too is marked by glaring double standards. The right-wing brigade led by the BJP has used the Tibet plank for their virulent anti-communist, anti-China hysteria. But the Indian State's own treatment of nationality struggles in Kashmir and the North East has been marked by arrogant and brutal military suppression. ``Special Powers'' have been conferred on the Armed Forces giving them a licence to freely indulge in summary execution, rape and repression in both these regions. In spite of popular struggles demanding scrapping of the AFSPA, the Indian State continues to justify and impose the AFSPA in the name of anti-insurgency. The BJP has led the jingoistic cries for even harsher and more bloody military suppression of the aspirations of the people of Kashmir and the North East, decrying every demand for autonomy as a threat to *Akhand Bharat* (undivided India). The reports of Tibetan protests outside Tibet, even in Beijing, certainly point to a greater degree of integration of Tibet with China than that of, say, Kashmir with the rest of India: how many times have we seen a Kashmiri Muslim protesting on the streets of Delhi?

The Tibet situation must be viewed in the context of the many shifts and phases in China's Tibet policy and in the Tibetan movement's own priorities between 1959 and 2008. Tibet has been touched by significant economic development and by the late '70s, China had allowed for greater accommodation of Tibetan culture, language and religion. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, however, there was a change of mood. The Dalai Lama, spurning an offer to visit China, elected instead for greater closeness with the US. With descriptions by the US Congress of Tibet as an ``occupied'' territory coinciding with renewed outbursts in Tibet, China once more tightened its grip.

The Tibetan movement, in the course of time, has come to focus mainly on issues of autonomy rather than that of secession. The protesters may raise shouts of ``Free Tibet'', but this slogan does not seem to find wide acceptance in the Tibetan mainstream today. Even the Dalai Lama, the internationally recognised icon of Tibet, has reiterated in the wake of the current turmoil that genuine autonomy is what the Tibetan people want.

In such circumstances China would do well to address the aspirations for autonomy through political dialogue rather than by repression and martial law. The spectacle of protesting Buddhist monks being brutalised by armed forces can hardly evade comparisons with similar scenes in military-ruled Burma and the tragic stigma of Tiananmen.

One hopes that China will take proper lessons from the Soviet experience, where bruised national sentiments played no small part in the great shipwreck. Democratic and peace-loving people of the world are deeply concerned over the situation in Tibet, and expect China to handle the agitations and the ethnic tensions with greater sensitivity and maturity. China's stance on economic questions has been one of pragmatic flexibility: in the case of Hong Kong, China has shown its willingness to experiment with a policy of ``one country, two systems'', where the Central People's Government is responsible for the territory's defence and foreign affairs, while the Government of Hong Kong is responsible for its own legal system, police force, monetary system, customs policy, immigration policy and so on. Can't we, then, expect greater accommodation on China's part of Tibetan aspirations for autonomy?

While resolutely resisting every attempt to fan an anti-communist and anti-China frenzy over Tibet, we do hold that state repression can only be counterproductive, providing grist to the imperialist mill and allowing greater room for US interference in the region. A lasting solution can be reached only through political dialogue in a democratic atmosphere.

Sunday, March 23, 2008

The Man Between War and Peace


By Thomas P.M. Barnett
As the White House talked up conflict with Iran,
the head of U.S. Central Command, William "Fox" Fallon, talked it down.
Now he has resigned.


1.
If, in the dying light of the Bush administration, we go to war with Iran, it'll all come down to one man. If we do not go to war with Iran, it'll come down to the same man. He is that rarest of creatures in the Bush universe: the good cop on Iran, and a man of strategic brilliance. His name is William Fallon, although all of his friends call him "Fox," which was his fighter-pilot call sign decades ago. Forty years into a military career that has seen this admiral rule over America's two most important combatant commands, Pacific Command and now United States Central Command, it's impossible to make this guy--as he likes to say--"nervous in the service." Past American governments have used saber rattling as a useful tactic to get some bad actor on the world stage to fall in line. This government hasn't mastered that kind of subtlety. When Dick Cheney has rattled his saber, it has generally meant that he intends to use it. And in spite of recent war spasms aimed at Iran from this sclerotic administration, Fallon is in no hurry to pick up any campaign medals for Iran. And therein lies the rub for the hard-liners led by Cheney. Army General David Petraeus, commanding America's forces in Iraq, may say, "You cannot win in Iraq solely in Iraq," but Fox Fallon is Petraeus's boss, and he is the commander of United States Central Command, and Fallon doesn't extend Petraeus's logic to mean war against Iran. So while Admiral Fallon's boss, President George W. Bush, regularly trash-talks his way to World War III and his administration casually casts Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as this century's Hitler (a crown it has awarded once before, to deadly effect), it's left to Fallon--and apparently Fallon alone--to argue that, as he told Al Jazeera last fall: "This constant drumbeat of conflict . . . is not helpful and not useful. I expect that there will be no war, and that is what we ought to be working for. We ought to try to do our utmost to create different conditions."
What America needs, Fallon says, is a "combination of strength and willingness to engage." Those are fighting words to your average neocon--not to mention your average supporter of Israel, a good many of whom in Washington seem never to have served a minute in uniform. But utter those words for print and you can easily find yourself defending your indifference to "nuclear holocaust." How does Fallon get away with so brazenly challenging his commander in chief? The answer is that he might not get away with it for much longer. President Bush is not accustomed to a subordinate who speaks his mind as freely as Fallon does, and the president may have had enough. Just as Fallon took over Centcom last spring, the White House was putting itself on a war footing with Iran. Almost instantly, Fallon began to calmly push back against what he saw as an ill-advised action. Over the course of 2007, Fallon's statements in the press grew increasingly dismissive of the possibility of war, creating serious friction with the White House. Last December, when the National Intelligence Estimate downgraded the immediate nuclear threat from Iran, it seemed as if Fallon's caution was justified. But still, well-placed observers now say that it will come as no surprise if Fallon is relieved of his command before his time is up next spring, maybe as early as this summer, in favor of a commander the White House considers to be more pliable. If that were to happen, it may well mean that the president and vice-president intend to take military action against Iran before the end of this year and don't want a commander standing in their way. And so Fallon, the good cop, may soon be unemployed because he's doing what a generation of young officers in the U. S. military are now openly complaining that their leaders didn't do on their behalf in the run-up to the war in Iraq: He's standing up to the commander in chief, whom he thinks is contemplating a strategically unsound war.
It's not that Fallon is risk averse--anything but. "When I look at the Middle East," he says late one recent night in Afghanistan, "I'd just as soon double down on the bet." When Fallon is serious, his voice is feathery and he tends to speak in measured koans that, taken together, say, Have no fear. Let Washington be a tempest. Wherever I am is the calm center of the storm. And Fallon is in no hurry to call Iran's hand on the nuclear question. He is as patient as the White House is impatient, as methodical as President Bush is mercurial, and simply has, as one aide put it, "other bright ideas about the region." Fallon is even more direct: In a part of the world with "five or six pots boiling over, our nation can't afford to be mesmerized by one problem." And if it comes to war? "Get serious," the admiral says. "These guys are ants. When the time comes, you crush them."2.
It was Rumsfeld's fall that led to Fallon picking up his greatest and, inevitably, final mission. Smart guy that he is, Robert Gates, the incoming secretary of defense, finagled Fallon out of Pacific Command, where he'd been radically making peace with the Chinese, so that he could, among other things, provide a check on the eager-to-please General David Petraeus in Iraq. As the head of U. S. Central Command, his beat is the desert that stretches from East Africa to the Chinese border--a fractious little sandbox with Iraq on one edge and Afghanistan on the other and tens of thousands of American boots already on the ground in both. Pakistan's there in one corner, threatening to boil over and spill its nuclear jihadists forth upon the world; in another, the Gaza Strip continues to hum like a bowstring; and up north, the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, the 'Stans, rattle along under dictators who range from the merely authoritarian to the genuinely insane. And right in the middle lies Iran.
Where there's peace in the region, how do you keep it? Where there's war, how do you contain it or end it? Where there are threats, how do you counter them? For starters, you might want to make some friends. Which is what Fallon was doing recently on a tour of his area of responsibility. It's late November in smoggy, car-infested Cairo, and I'm standing in the front lobby of a rather ornate "infantry officers club" on the outskirts of the old town center. Central Command's just finished its large, biannual regional exercise called Bright Star, and today Egypt's army is hosting a "senior leadership seminar" for all the attending generals. It's the barroom scene from Star Wars, with more national uniforms than I can count. Judging by Fallon's grimace as his official party passes, I can tell that the cover story in this morning's Egyptian Gazette landed hard on somebody's desk at the White House. U.S. RULES OUT STRIKE AGAINST IRAN, read the banner headline, and the accompanying photo showed Fallon in deep consultation with Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Fallon sidles up to me during a morning coffee break. "I'm in hot water again," he says. "The White House?" The admiral slowly nods his head. "They say, 'Why are you even meeting with Mubarak?' " This seems to utterly mystify Fallon. "Why?" he says, shrugging with palms extending outward. "Because it's my job to deal with this region, and it's all anyone wants to talk about right now. People here hear what I'm saying and understand. I don't want to get them too spun up. Washington interprets this as all aimed at them. Instead, it's aimed at governments and media in this region. I'm not talking about the White House." He points to the ground, getting exercised. "This is my center of gravity. This is my job." Fallon was quietly opposed to a long-term surge in Iraq, because more of our military assets tied down in Iraq makes it harder to come up with a comprehensive strategy for the Middle East, and he knew how that looked to higher-ups. He also knows that sometimes his statements on Iran strike the same people as running "counter to stated policy." "But look," he says, "yesterday I'm speaking in front of 250 Egyptian businessmen over lunch here in Cairo, and these guys keep holding up newspapers and asking, 'Is this true and can you explain, please?' I need to present the threats and capabilities in the appropriate language. That's one of my duties."
Fallon explains his approach to Iran the same way he explains why he doesn't make Al Qaeda the focus of his regional strategy as Centcom's commander: "What's the best and most effective way to combat Al Qaeda? We tend to make too much or too little a deal about it. I want a more even keel. I come from the school of 'walk softly and carry a big stick.' " Fallon is the American at the center of every circle in this part of the world. And it is a testament to his skill, and to the failure of American diplomacy, that so much is left for this military man to do himself. He spends very little time at Centcom headquarters in Tampa and is instead constantly "forward," on the move between Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and all the 'Stans of Central Asia. He was with Pakistani strongman Pervez Musharraf the day before he declared emergency rule last fall. "I'm not the chief diplomat of this country, and certainly not the secretary of state," Fallon says in Kabul's Green Zone the next night. "But I am close to the problems." So, he says, that leaves him no choice but to work these issues, day in and day out.Late that night, I am sitting with Fallon deep in the compound that encompasses the presidential palace and the International Security Assistance Force. We are alone inside the cramped office of ISAF's chief public-affairs officer. Fallon had spent several hours with "Mushi" the day before in Islamabad, discussing his impending decision. The press coverage would emphasize how Fallon had sternly warned Musharraf not to impose emergency rule. But on this night, the admiral seems neither alarmed by the move nor resigned to its more negative implications. As he talks, Fallon casually takes off the elastic bands that clamp his camo pants to his regulation tan boots. He's beat after a long day that included meetings with President Karzai and a helicopter trip to Khost, Osama bin Laden's pre-9/11 Afghanistan stronghold. But it was the martial law next door in Pakistan that is the focus of the world. Fallon has been through this before.
"I didn't do any preaching," Fallon says about his talks with Musharraf. "In a previous life here, I had two extra constitutional events: a coup in Thailand, and a head of the military took over in Fiji. So I talked to the president for quite a while yesterday, both with the ambassador and then alone. He walked me through his rationale for what he was going to do and why he was going to do it and why he thought he had to do it. We talked about what planning he'd done for this, the downsides of this, what could happen, and how that could screw up a lot of things. At the end of the day, it's his country and he's the boss of it, and he's going to make his decision." Before he walked into that room in Islamabad, Fallon had plenty of calls from Washington with instructions to pressure Musharraf down another path. "I'll talk to him," Fallon replied. "There's an awful lot of china that could break. So I'll do it in a professional manner, because I still have to work with him." As the admiral recounts the exchange, his voice is flat, his gaze steady. His calculus on this subject is far more complex than anyone else's. He is neither an idealist nor a fantasist. In Pakistan, he has the most volatile combination of forces in the world, yet he is deeply calm. "Did I tell President Musharraf this is not a recommended course of action? Of course. Did I tell him there are very negative effects that this could have? Of course. Is he aware of these? Yes."He's made his calculations. He feels very strongly that he's responsible for his country. His alternative is to step down. That would not be the most helpful thing for his country." Why not?"It's a very immature democracy. Look at the history of the place. It's rough. Musharraf knows his country. He knows what he's got. Their factions, their tribes. There's that group of folks that wants nothing more than to start war with India, another group that wants to take over the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas], another group that wants to take over part of Baluchistan. He's got a tough road. Most guys in his position do."
As for Washington's notion that Benazir Bhutto's return to the country would fix all that, Fallon is pessimistic. He slowly shakes his head. "Better forget that." Less than two months later, of course, his rueful prophesy will be confirmed when Bhutto is murdered by militants in Rawalpindi. Meanwhile, Fallon argues that with U. S. plans in the offing to arm Pashtun tribes against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the FATA, now would not seem to be the time to be pushing the democracy agenda in Pakistan. When Fallon asked Musharraf, "How long do you expect to have to do it?" the general answered, "Not long." And twenty-four hours later, Fallon counseled patience. After all, he said, think about how strong America's military relationship is with Egypt despite Hosni Mubarak's twenty-seven-year "emergency rule." But that doesn't mean the relationship building remains limited to just Musharraf, and so the rest of Fallon's long day in Islamabad was spent networking with General Ashfaq Kayani, former head of Pakistan's much-feared Interservices Intelligence agency and new chief of army staff. If Musharraf were ever to step or be pushed aside, Kayani is a leading contender to replace him. But more to the point for Fallon, Kayani becomes the operational point man for any increased collaboration between the U. S. military and the Pakistani army to tackle the issues of the FATA, which a Centcom senior intelligence official calls "the huge elephant in the closet." That's putting it mildly. The tribal region is where, according to our own National Intelligence Estimate last year, Al Qaeda was reconstituting its operational capacity, and was now in its strongest position since 9/11. As with Pakistan, Fallon keeps his powder dry when he deals with Iran. He doesn't react like Pavlov's dog to inflammatory rhetoric from inflammatory little men. He understands the basic rule of international diplomacy: Everybody gets a move.
"Tehran's feeling pretty cocky right now because they've been able to inflict pain on us in Iraq and Afghanistan." So the trick, in Fallon's mind, is "to try to figure out what it is they really want and then, maybe--not that we're going to play Santa Claus here or the Good Humor Man--but the fact is that everyone needs something in this world, and so most countries that are functional and are contributing to the world have found a way to trade off their strengths for other strengths to help them out. These guys are trying to go it alone in this respect, and it's a bad gene pool right now. It's not one with much longevity. So they play that card pretty regularly, and at some point you just kind of run out of games, it seems to me. You've got to play a real card." And when the real cards finally get played, that's when Fallon will double down.

3. The first thing you notice is the face, the second is the voice.A tall, wiry man with thinning white hair, Fallon comes off like a loner even when he's standing in a crowd.Despite having an easy smile that he regularly pulls out for his many daily exercises in relationship building, Fallon's consistent game face is a slightly pissed-off glare. It's his default expression. Don't fuck with me, it says. A tough Catholic boy from New Jersey, his favorite compliment is "badass." Fallon's got a fearsome reputation, although no one I ever talk to in the business can quite pin down why. There are the stories of his wilder days as a young officer, not the partying stuff but more the variety of rules bent to the breaking point, and he's been known as anything but a dove in his various commands, which makes his later roles as champion for engagement with both China and Iran all the more strange. In keeping with the naval-officer tradition of emasculating bluntness, Fallon can without remorse cut the nuts off peers and subordinates alike. But it is more the intimation of his ferocity than its exercise that has the greatest effect. And Fallon has recently discovered that his reputation can leave him open to stories that might sound true but are not. Last fall, it was reported in the press that Fallon had called General Petraeus an "ass-kissing little chickenshit" for being so willing to serve as the administration's political frontman on the Iraq surge. The old man had told reporters that it hadn't happened like that--that that's not the way he operates, and, in fact, any time he talks with Petraeus, there are only two men in the room--the admiral and the general--and their exchanges remain private. And when they're not in the same room, "We e-mail each other constantly and talk by phone just about every day." Just the two of them, he says. No outsiders observing. The press sources had an overactive imagination, Fallon said. Now when the subject comes up, he dismisses it with a wave of his hand.
"Absolute bullshit," Fallon tells me. Fallon and his executive assistant, Captain Craig Faller, say that they both suspect "staff agitation" to be behind the story. Interservice rivalry is mighty strong, and Admiral Fallon is the first navy man to be head of Centcom, so it's not hard for them to imagine somebody from the Army stirring the pot.Fallon says the tip-off that the story was bogus was the word chickenshit. "My kids called me up laughing about that one, saying they knew the story wasn't true because I never use that word." So put Fallon down as a "bullshit" and not a "chickenshit" kind of guy.And in truth, Fallon's not a screamer. Indeed, by my long observation and the accounts of a dozen people, he doesn't raise his voice whatsoever, except when he laughs. Instead, the more serious he becomes, the quieter he gets, and his whispers sound positively menacing. Other guys can jaw-jaw all they want about the need for war-war with . . . whomever is today's target among D. C.'s many armchair warriors. Not Fallon. Let the president pop off. Fallon won't. No bravado here, nor sound-bite-sized threats, but rather a calm, leathery presence. Fallon is comfortable risking peace because he's comfortable waging war. And when he conveys messages to the enemies of the United States, he does it not in the provocative cowboy style that has prevailed in Washington so far this century, but with the opposite--a studied quiet that makes it seem as if he is trying to bend them to his will with nothing but the sound of his voice. So when, during a press conference in Astana, Kazakhstan, Fallon whispers, "The public behavior of Iran has been unhelpful to the region," with his pissed-off glare and his slightly hoarse delivery, he is saying, I'm not making you an offer; I'm telling you what your options are right now. "Iran should be playing a constructive role," he continues. "I hear this from every country in the region."
Translation: I've got you surrounded. He'd rather not do it, but if he has to go to war, there won't be any anguish. Whatever qualms Fallon had about using force were exorcised long ago in the skies over Vietnam. "I try to be reasonably predictable to my own people and very unpredictable to potential adversaries," he tells me. No wonder Fallon sticks out like a sore thumb with the neocons, who have the unfortunate tendency to come off as unpredictable to their allies and predictable to their enemies. Which is the opposite of strategy. He knows this stuff cold, because he's had his hand on the stick for a very long time. The oldest of nine kids, Fallon's old man was a mailman in Merchantville, New Jersey, following his World War II stint in the Army Air Corps. As a boy, Fallon delivered newspapers, bagged groceries, worked in the local Campbell's Soup plant, and would become the first in his family to attend college. His dad's military experiences, along with those of several of his mom's brothers, naturally pushed him in the direction of West Point. But his local congressman screwed up his application, and so Fallon chose the naval ROTC program at nearby Villanova, a Catholic haven that has produced three Centcom commanders. More than thirteen hundred carrier landings later, Fallon began his long climb through various combat command experiences--including Desert Storm and Bosnia--to the pinnacle of his profession: four four-star assignments that include vice chief of Naval Operations, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, and then boss of Pacific Command and Central Command in rapid succession. Sitting in his Tampa headquarters office last fall, I asked Fallon if he considered the Centcom assignment to be the same career-capping job that it'd been for his predecessors. He just laughed and said, "Career capping? How about career detonating?" At the time, I took that comment to be mere self-effacement. I have since come to think that Fallon was deadly serious.
Weeks later, back in that hotel lounge in Kazakhstan, after a brutal eighteen-hour day of wall-to-wall summits and meetings, Fallon is in a more pensive mood, admitting that he never expected to stay this long in the service. At sixty-three, he's one of the oldest flag officers in uniform, and if you count his ROTC time, he's been in for a whopping forty-five years total. And at this cookie-cutter chain hotel deep in the 'Stans, Fallon wears an expression that is equal parts fatigue and bewilderment. "I expected to be running a start-up company by now," he says.But something else came up. 4. When the Admiral took charge of Pacific Command in 2005, he immediately set about a military-to-military outreach to the Chinese armed forces, something that had plenty of people freaking out at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. The Chinese, after all, were scheduled to be our next war. What the hell was Fallon doing? Contrary to some reports, though, Fallon says he initially had no trouble with then-secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld on the subject. "Early on, I talked to him. I said, Here's what I think. And I talked to the president, too." It was only after the Pentagon and Congress started realizing that their favorite "programs of record" (i.e., weapons systems and major vehicle platforms) were threatened by such talks that the shit hit the fan. "I blew my stack," Fallon says. "I told Rumsfeld, Just look at this shit. I go up to the Hill and I get three or four guys grabbing me and jerking me out of the aisle, all because somebody came up and told them that the sky was going to cave in." But Fallon stood down the China hawks, because as much as military leaders have to plan for war, Fallon seems to understand better than most the role they also have to play in everything else beyond war. And like a good cop, Fallon doesn't want to fire his gun unless he absolutely has to. "I wouldn't have done what I did if I didn't think it was the right thing to do, which I still do. China is our most important relationship for the future, given the realities of people, economics, and location. We've got to work hard and make sure we do our best to get it right."
For Fallon, that meant an emphasis on opening new lines of communication and reducing the capacity for misunderstanding during times of crisis. But beyond that, it meant telling the Chinese, "If you want to be treated as a big boy and a major player, you've got to act like it." If you want recognition of your power, then you have to accept the responsibility that comes with such power. That's the essential message Fallon delivered to the Chinese, and if that meant he was out of line with the Pentagon's take on rising China, then so be it. If it seemed as though Fallon was downplaying the threat of North Korea's missiles, it was because he preferred pushing a regional response that signaled a united front but still left the door open for North Korea to come in from the cold. Fallon now brings the same approach to Iran in Central Command: "I want to go through something positive rather than a negative like Iran, which is a real problem." To that end, and right on the heels of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's meetings with Middle Eastern ministers of defense, Fallon held a similar summit of Persian Gulf chiefs of defense in Tampa earlier this year, something Centcom has never attempted before. Could Iran be a participant in something like this down the road? "Oh, absolutely, eventually. It's like the Chinese," he says. "It would be great if Iran turned into a team that decided to play ball in the end." So how does something like this happen? How do you turn Iran into a responsible regional player? How can the United States even approach Iran when the regime seems populated by only hard-liners and ultraconservatives? You start down low, says one of Fallon's senior intelligence officials. For example, there's the shared interest in stemming the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan to Iran. "Iran has a huge drug problem," so that's "a potential cooperative area." More recently, the Iranians promised to stop the flow of munitions into Iraq, arguably contributing to the dramatic decrease in U. S. casualties from roadside bombs. After three sets of talks with the Iranians last summer that went nowhere, another round is being teed up. To Fallon, this sort of engagement is crucial, given America's overall lack of experience in dealing with Iran.
"I don't know as much as I'd like about Iran," he says. "You've got to go elsewhere, to people in other countries. There aren't many Americans who've had extensive experience with these guys. So that puts us both at a disadvantage. Plus they're secretive--intentionally so--about us. It makes it more of a challenge." Early in his tenure at Pacific Command, Fallon let it be known that he was interested in visiting the city of Harbin in the highly controlled and isolated Heilongjiang Military District on China's northern border with Russia. The Chinese were flabbergasted at the request, but when Fallon's command plane took off one afternoon from Mongolia, heading for Harbin without permission, Beijing relented. The local Chinese commander was beside himself. It was the first time in his life he had ever met an American military officer, and here he was at the bottom of a jet ramp waiting for the all-powerful head of the United States Pacific Command to descend. Then, to his horror, he realized that Fallon had brought his wife, Mary, along for the trip. Scrambling to arrange the evening banquet, the Chinese commander brought his own wife out in public for the first time ever. When the time came for dinner toasts, after the Chinese commander thanked Mrs. Fallon for coming, the admiral returned the favor by thanking the commander's wife for her many years of service as a military spouse. The commander's wife broke down in tears, saying it was the first time in her entire marriage that she had been publicly recognized for her many sacrifices. And there was peace in our time.


5. Fallon is what is called a "four-star action officer," meaning he tries to do too many things himself. He spends no more than a week each month in Tampa, Centcom's headquarters. Captain Faller jokes that if it weren't for federal holidays, Fallon's staff wouldn't know what a day off even was.
Fallon travels at least three weeks out of each month, spending, on average, two weeks in theater, meaning the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and Central Asia. He travels to Iraq and Afghanistan every month like clockwork. It's an unseasonably warm early-winter morning in Kabul, and Fallon is out in the field, walking his beat. And short of the president of the United States himself, this convoy is the richest and most opportune terrorist target in the world at present. So everybody wears the heavy armor. Weighed down by a helmet that feels like twenty pounds--applied directly to my forehead--and a desert-camo flak jacket that's decidedly heavier, I climb into the back of an armored Suburban that'll play third-on-a-match in Fallon's three-vehicle convoy. We are told to expect a bumpy ride, as ours is the vehicle that will routinely swerve from side to side to position itself to ram any vehicle that might approach the command vehicle from the side. It's like riding in a car with the biggest asshole in the world behind the wheel. We almost pass Fallon's vehicle--time after time--only to slam on the brakes, slip back behind, lurch over to the other side, and do the same thing. A word of advice: Don't do this on a heavy breakfast. Fallon's personal enlisted aide, strapped in next to us, says our driver is actually being fairly mellow, on the admiral's orders. That's good to hear, as the streets are full of women and children on foot. Thirty minutes after we've left the maze of barricades that line every entrance into the Green Zone, giving the place a sort of Maxwell Smart sense of never-ending doors, we arrive at a military airport where two Black Hawk UH-60's await. I ride with Fallon's senior aides in the second one. I am strapped into a four-part harness, the body armor keeping me well cocooned. Minutes after takeoff, as is the universal custom among military personnel, everyone but the personal-security-detail soldiers is asleep.
I scan the moonscape that is the mountains west of Kabul.Traveling at high speed, we've been dipping ever so gently around the mountains as we travel to Bamiyan Province, ancient home to the giant Buddhas that are no more--parting shots from the once and future Taliban. I can spot Fallon's Black Hawk out the window, framed from above by the sky and below by the barrel of a large machine gun sticking out of our helicopter's side. It's manned by a rather short fellow whose face is almost completely obscured by his Star Wars blast shield. The view is amazing and reminds me why banditry and smuggling remain dominant industries here. Every road seems to lie at the bottom of a narrow, meandering ravine, and every walled compound looks like a fort out of America's Wild West days. Most of the time, the only things moving across this barren landscape are the shadows from our helos. We alight from the Black Hawks after touching down on a strip of asphalt located in the center of the wide, flat plain that is Bamiyan Valley. Immediately your eyes are drawn to the dominant geological feature: cliff walls as high as skyscrapers that run along the valley's northern edge as far as the eye can see. Carved into the stunning vertical cliff are two empty frames, each running fifteen or so meters deep into the rock. Here stood the gigantic stone Buddhas carved hundreds of years ago by monks who lived in a warren of caves connecting the statues. We're met at the landing zone by the Kiwi colonel, Brendon Fraher, who leads a small unit of New Zealand's finest civil-affairs specialists operating out of a small fort a few clicks away. The camp is home to a Provincial Reconstruction Team manned by the Kiwis, who work hand in glove with U. S. State Department, U. S. Agency for International Development, and ISAF personnel in coordinating coalition reconstruction aid to this province. As we head to a convoy of armored Ford F-350 pickups, Fallon says that Fraher reports two enemy rockets landed nearby yesterday, but other than that, all's quiet. We speed off to meet the only female provincial governor in Afghanistan. Pulling up to the local government building, we pile out of the pickups and file into a large receiving room blanketed by modest Persian rugs and surrounded by even more modest couches. Just inside, we strip off the helmets and vests and heap them into a pile of fabric-covered metal and ceramic in the corner, all of it too heavy to hang on any coatrack.
Fallon--who's done this sort of thing so often, he seems to glide through the protocol--zeroes in on Governor Habiba Sarabi, a middle-aged woman of average height who's dressed in a reform sort of way--head covered but face exposed. Despite all our accompanying security, you've got to believe she's the biggest Taliban target in the room. Tea is served and formal greetings are exchanged with no need for translation, as the governor speaks English with calculated fluency, a skill she demonstrates a half hour into the meeting, when Fallon makes clear that he wants to hear her complaints. It's a tricky moment for Sarabi, because she's basically critiquing Western aid and the military agencies represented by the officials surrounding her now. It's like bitching about your parents in front of Child Protective Services: Strike the right note and you might suddenly find yourself free of them for good. Speaking about a road long-promised by Kabul and the coalition that would connect this isolated valley to Afghanistan's central circular artery, the Ring Road, she suddenly blurts out, "This is three years that the Bamiyan people have been waiting for this road!" Fallon aggressively queries the assembled officials in order, running from the deputy chief of mission at the U. S. embassy to the USAID leader to the ISAF officers and, finally, the local Kiwi PRT commander. Each offers a typically complex, bureaucratic response in turn. Glancing at the governor, I can almost feel her anger rising. With obvious passion, Sarabi interrupts the proceedings with a stream of complaints about the length and complexity of USAID's planning process. This is where her fluency in English suddenly falters, as Sarabi's sentences start trailing off, leading the assembled officials to fill in the blanks. "It is very . . . " "Long?" chimes in the USAID official. "And there is such a lack of . . . ahh." Sarabi raises a finger to her chin, scanning the far wall as if the word lingers there.
"Coordination?" offers the deputy chief of mission. "It all makes me so incredibly . . . how do you say?" "Mad?" one officer suggests. "Depressed?" "Angry?" It's almost like an auction now as the bids keep rising. I'm just about ready to toss in my personal favorite, "pissed off," when Fallon weighs in with "frustrated"--no question mark. Sarabi turns toward the admiral, a sly smile passes across her face. Fallon starts probing yet again, this time cutting off officials, as their answers obscure rather than illuminate. Emboldened, the governor piles on with a new complaint: Every winter, a local river becomes impassable for a local migratory tribe that is then stranded outside the valley. Fallon asks the deputy chief of mission, "Are you aware of this?" The DCM replies, "No, I wasn't, and I promise to look into that." Fallon's on a roll now, and the governor is beaming, but his efforts soon head into a bureaucratic cul-de-sac that no one in the room can fix. Kabul's central government simply does not prioritize this heartland province. Fallon asks the senior American ISAF officer if the coalition could arrange a Bailey pontoon bridge just for the winter months. In return, he gets a complex answer about past surveys. Fallon cuts him off and turns to the governor. "I tell you what, I'm not getting a satisfactory answer here. I'll be honest. I don't think we can do anything for you this winter. However, I will try to get, from many miles away, a screwdriver big enough to push this process for next year." The governor immediately thanks Fallon for his promise. Fallon doesn't forget details like that. Six months earlier, he noticed that the American flag flying outside the Hyatt hotel in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, was frayed. He had told one of the defense attachés at the U. S. embassy to get it replaced. The beaten-up flag was still there when we arrived. It's late on the fifth straight day of nonstop travel that has taken Fallon's entourage from Florida to Qatar to Pakistan to Afghanistan and now to Kyrgyzstan. Tomorrow, Tajikistan, where he'll have to put up with the Putin clone who is president. So at the moment, maybe the flag is not all that's frayed. His gaze fixed on it, Fallon quietly repeats his order, his voice so low and so quiet that you can almost hear somebody's next promotion getting axed.


6. Unlike his Arabic-speaking predecessor, Army General John Abizaid, Fox Fallon wasn't selected to lead U. S. Central Command for his regional knowledge or cultural sensitivity, but because he is, says Secretary of Defense Gates, "one of the best strategic thinkers in uniform today."If anything has been sorely missing to date in America's choices in the Middle East and Central Asia, it has been a strategic mind-set that consistently keeps its eyes on the real prize: connecting these isolated regions in a far more broadband fashion to the global economy. Instead of effectively countering the efforts of others (e.g., the radical Salafis, Saudi Arabia's Wahhabists, Russia's security services, China's energy sector) who would fashion such connectivity to their selfish ends, Washington has wasted precious time focusing excessively on transforming the political systems of Iraq and Afghanistan, as though governments somehow birth functioning societies and economies instead of the other way around. Waiting on perfect security or perfect politics to forge economic relationships is a fool's errand. By the time those fantastic conditions are met in this dangerous, unstable part of the world, somebody less idealistic will be running the place--the Russians, Chinese, Pakistanis, Indians, Turks, Iranians, Saudis. That's why Fallon has been aggressively hawking his southern strategy of encouraging a north-south "energy corridor" between the Central Asian republics and the energy-starved-but-booming Asian subcontinent (read: Islamabad down through Bangalore and then east to Kolkata), with both Afghanistan and Pakistan as crucial conduits. On this trip, he's been shepherding a new bridge that links isolated Tajikistan with Afghanistan. The potential here is huge: Tajikistan is 95 percent mountainous and extremely food dependent. Its main asset is its untapped hydroelectric capacity. Afghanistan presents just the opposite picture--food to export but most of the country lacks an effective electric grid.
So what should America be pushing first in both states? Free-and-clear elections for massively impoverished populations, or whatever it takes to get Tajikistan's resource with Afghanistan's resource? Which path, do you think, would scare the Taliban and Al Qaeda more? To Fallon, there isn't even a question to answer. But this part of the world is defined by its fortresses, and is not known for willingly connecting to the outside world. Tajikistan's powerful security chief, Khayriddin Abdurahimov, had been doing his best to gum up the works on the just-finished bridge, which he allowed to open for business only four hours a day. Having just achieved control of the country's border-security agency, Abdurahimov believed the bridge made the country vulnerable to Afghanistan's dangerous drugs and nothing more. On the eve of Fallon's arrival, President Emomali Rahmon intervened and extended the bridge's operating schedule to eight hours a day, admitting to Fallon in their first summit that he needs to do more to champion the economic potential. But Fallon doesn't stop there. Immediately following his meeting with Rahmon, he meets face-to-face with the highly secretive Abdurahimov, who almost never meets with foreign officials. Just as with Musharraf, Fallon does not preach. He suggests, he encourages, he cajoles, he offers, and he debates, but he does not preach--save the gospel of economic connectivity. Even there, he is not eager to appear competitive with any regional power. "I don't want to create the impression that we're just replacing the Russians," he says. He just wants a damn bridge. Fallon gets his bridge.7. Fallon's got a spread in a little town in Montana. The streams of this town seem to be full of eighteen-inch fish that he says he'd like to take a crack at someday soon. But the fish of Fallon's town are safe for the moment. While Condoleezza Rice and the State Department manage a vague endgame on the two-state solution in Palestine, Gates and Fallon have begun the regional-security dialogue that's truly regional in scope.
The rollback of Al Qaeda seems to be both real and continuing, save for the border region of Pakistan. And to gain greater flexibility to plan for the region, Fallon says that he is determined to draw down in Iraq. One of the reasons Fallon says he banished the term "long war" from Centcom's vocabulary is that he believes real victory in this struggle will be defined in economic terms first, and so the emphasis on war struck him as "too narrow." But the term also signaled a long haul that Fallon simply finds unacceptable. He wants troop levels in Iraq down now, and he wants the Afghan National Army running the show throughout most of Afghanistan by the end of this year. Fallon says he wants to move the pile dramatically in the time he's got remaining, however long that may be. And he gets frustrated. "I grind my teeth at the pace of change." Freeing the United States from being tied down in Iraq means a stronger effort in Afghanistan, more focus on Pakistan, and more time spent creating networks of relationships in Central Asia. With Syria and Lebanon recently added to Centcom's area of responsibility, look to see Fallon popping up in Beirut and Damascus regularly. And he says he is more than willing to take on Israel and Palestine to boot, which for now remains a bastard stepchild of European Command. The Persian Gulf right now is booming economically, and Fallon wants to harness that power to connect the failed states that pockmark the landscape to the outside world. In this choice, he sees no alternative. "What I learned in the Pacific is that after a while the tableau of failed, failing, or dysfunctional states becomes a real burden on the functional countries and a problem for their neighborhood, because they breed unrest and insecurities and attract troublemakers very well. They're like sewers, and they begin to fester. It's bad for business. And when it's bad for business, people tend to start restricting their investments, and they restrict their thinking, and it allows more barriers, so we're back to building walls again instead of breaking them down. If you have to build walls, it means you're moving backward."
Fallon has no illusion about solving the Middle East or Central Asia during his tenure, but he's also acutely conscious that with globalization's rapid advance into these regions he may well be the last Centcom commander of his kind. Already Fallon sees the inevitability and utility of having a Chinese military partnership at Centcom, and he'd like to manage that inevitably from the start rather than have to repair damage down the line. "I'd like to continue to do things that will be useful to the world and its inhabitants," he says. "I've seen a lot of good things, and I've seen a lot of stupid things." And then there is Iran. No sooner had the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei signaled a willingness to deal with any American but George W. Bush, and no sooner had Fallon signaled America's willingness to refrain from bombing Tehran, than a little international incident occurred. Just the kind of incident that doughy neocons dream sweetly about. Right after the new year, three American ships were passing through the Strait of Hormuz, exchanging normal greetings with Gulf State navies, checking them out as they passed. The same with the Iranian navy. And then, suddenly, small Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps boats started speeding toward the American ships, showing, the admiral says, "very stupid behavior, showboating, and provocative taunts. Given that it was a small boat that did in the USS Cole, this was very dangerous behavior."The Iranians dropped boxes in the water, simulating mines. "Remember," he says, "my first day on this job, I was greeted by the IRGC snatching the British sailors, and so it was a sense of here we go again. You wonder, Are they really acting on their own, because the pattern seems clear."Fallon's eyes narrow and his voice becomes that whisper: "This is not how a country that wants to be a big boy in the neighborhood behaves. How are we supposed to take these guys seriously as players in the region? You'd like to deal with them as big-league players, but when they do this, it's very tough."
As before, there is the text and the subtext. Admiral William Fallon shakes his head slowly, and his eyes say, These guys have no idea how much worse it could get for them. I am the reasonable one. And time will tell whether being reasonable will cost Admiral William Fallon his command.Find this article at: http://www.esquire.com/features/fox-fallon


Tibet and the March 10 commemoration of the CIA's 1959

By Gary Wilson
Has Tibet become the front line of a new nationalliberation struggle? Or is something else happening there?The U.S. news media are filled with stories about events unfolding in Tibet. Each news report, however, seems to include a note that much of what they are reporting cannot be confirmed. The sources of the reports are shadowy and unknown. If past practice is any indicator, it is likely that the U.S. State Department and the CIA are their primary sources.One frequently quoted source is John Ackerly. Who isAckerly? As president of the International Campaign forTibet, he and his group appear to work closely with theU.S. government, both the State Department and Congress, as part of its operations concerning Tibet. During the Cold War, Ackerly's Washington-based job was to work with "dissidents" in Eastern Europe, particularly Romania in 1978-80.A private international security agency in Washington,Harbor Lane Associates, lists Ackerly and theInternational Campaign for Tibet as its clients, alongwith former CIA Director and U.S. President George H.W. Bush and former Pentagon chief William Cohen.AP, Reuters and the other Western news agencies all quote Ackerly as a major source for exaggerated reports about the clashes that have just occurred in Tibet. For example, MSNBC on March 15 reported:"John Ackerly, of the International Campaign for Tibet, a group that supports demands for Tibetan autonomy, said in an e-mailed statement he feared 'hundreds of Tibetans have been arrested and are being interrogated and tortured.'"Qiangba PuncogQiangba Puncog, a Tibetan who is chair of the TibetAutonomous Regional Government, described the situation quite differently at a March 17 press briefing in Beijing.According to china.org.cn, China's state Web site, theTibetan leader said that allies of the exiled Dalai Lamaon March 14 "engaged in reckless beating, looting,smashing and burning and their activities soon spread to other parts of the city. These people focused onstreet-side shops, primary and middle schools, hospitals, banks, power and communications facilities and media organizations. They set fire to passing vehicles, they chased after and beat passengers on the street, and they launched assaults on shops, telecommunication service outlets and government buildings. Their behavior has caused severe damage to the life and property of local people, and seriously undermined law and order in Lhasa."'Thirteen innocent civilians were burned or stabbed todeath in the riot in Lhasa on March 14, and 61 police were injured, six of them seriously wounded,' said Qiangba Puncog."Statistics also show that rioters set fire to more than300 locations, including residential houses and 214 shops, and smashed and burned 56 vehicles. ..."Qiangba Puncog also claimed that security personnel did not carry or use any lethal weapons in dealing with the riot last Friday. ..."The violence was the result of a conspiracy betweendomestic and overseas groups that advocate 'Tibetindependence,' according to Qiangba Puncog. 'The Dalaiclique masterminded, planned and carefully organized the riot.'"According to Qiangba Puncog, on March 10, 49 years ago, the slave owners of old Tibet launched an armed rebellion aimed at splitting the country. That rebellion was quickly quelled. Every year since 1959, some separatists inside and outside China have held activities around the day of the rebellion. ..."Any secessionist attempt to sabotage Tibet's stabilitywill not gain people's support and is doomed to fail, hesaid."Meeting in New DelhiWhatever is taking place in Tibet has long been inpreparation. A conference was held in New Delhi, India,last June by "Friends of Tibet." It was described as aconference for the breakaway of Tibet.The news site phayul.com reported at the time that theconference was told "how the Olympics could provide the one chance for Tibetans to come out and protest." A call was issued for worldwide protests, a march of exiles from India to Tibet, and protests within Tibet—all tied to the upcoming Beijing Olympics.This was followed by a call this past January for an"uprising" in Tibet, issued by organizations based inIndia. The news report from Jan. 25 said that the "Tibetan People's Uprising Movement" was established Jan. 4 to focus on the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The beginning date for the "uprising" was to be March 10.At the time the call was issued, U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford was meeting with the Dalai Lama inDharamsala, India. U.S. Undersecretary of State PaulaDobriansky made a similar visit to Dharamsala lastNovember. Dobriansky is also a member of the neoconProject for a New American Century. She has been involved in the so-called color revolutions in Eastern Europe.Phayul.com reports that the Tibet "Uprising" group'sstatement says they are acting "in the spirit of the 1959 Uprising."The 1959 uprisingKnowing more about the 1959 "uprising" might help inunderstanding today's events in Tibet.In 2002 a book titled "The CIA's Secret War in Tibet" was published by the University Press of Kansas. The two authors—Kenneth Conboy of the Heritage Foundation and James Morrison, an Army veteran trainer for the CIA—proudly detail how the CIA set up and ran Tibet's so-called resistance movement. The Dalai Lama himself was on the CIA payroll and approved the CIA's plans for the armed uprising.The CIA put the Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thodup, incharge of the bloody 1959 armed attack. A contra army was trained by the CIA in Colorado and then dropped by U.S. Air Force planes into Tibet.The 1959 attack was a CIA planned and organized coupattempt, much like the later Bay of Pigs invasion ofsocialist Cuba. The purpose was to overthrow the existing Tibetan government and weaken the Chinese Revolution while tying the people of Tibet to U.S. imperialist interests. What does that say about today's March uprising, that's done in the same spirit?

Oh! What a lovely waiver

-P. Sainath
It was around the distress in regions like Vidharbha and Anantapur that the present 'farm loan waiver' was conceived. Growing knowledge of that distress, breaking through even the filters of a media unmoved by the crisis in the countryside, made the waiver both thinkable and acceptable. Odd then, that in its present form, it excludes the very regions whose pain brought it into existence.

Millions do indeed get relief from what is a positive step. (Though not quite as 'unprecedented' as some believe). Even the colonial raj went in for loan waivers or 'karza maafi' more than once. And those waivers addressed private moneylender debt. (There were no nationalised banks in those days.) That's something the present waiver does not touch — even though usury accounts for the overwhelming share of farm loans. In Vidharbha, money owed to private lenders would account for between two-thirds and three-fourths of all debt. In short, we haven't begun to resolve the debt crisis of these and millions of other farmers.
Unproductive holdings
The failure to touch moneylender debt is just the first problem. In Vidharbha, the average landholding size is 7.5 acres or 3.03 hectares. Way above the two-hectare cut-off mark for the bank loan waiver. Up to 50 per cent of Vidharbha's farmers are above this limit. Not because they are big landlords. They tend to have larger holdings as their land is unproductive and unirrigated. Poor adivasis in Yavatmal, for instance, often own over ten acres but get very little from their land. In Anantapur in Andhra Pradesh, too, many farmers will be left out by size or other norms. By contrast the farmers of Western Maharashtra, the Union Agriculture Minister's stronghold, will benefit greatly. Their holdings are smaller, well-irrigated and more productive.
For those with over two hectares, there is the old deal of "one-time settlement" of their bank loans. In this case, if they repay 75 per cent of the loan, they will be given a rebate of 25 per cent. Only very large farmers will gain from this. If the rest, drowning in debt, could pay 75 per cent of their dues, they wouldn't be committing suicide. They would pay hundred per cent.
Then, of those farmers falling within the two-hectare limit, only a small group have access to bank credit. So the gainers in this crisis-hit region will be a small percentage of the total number of farmers. It doesn't end there, though. The few who do qualify, gain much less than farmers in, say, Western Maharashtra. The average crop loan in sugarcane territory is Rs. 13,000 per acre. Apart from which farmers there get up to Rs. 18,000 per acre for drip irrigation. In Vidharbha's cotton regions, they get loans of just Rs. 4,400 per acre. So the scale of the write-off will be far greater for the relatively better off farmers. In political terms, this benefits Union Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar's base. At the same time, it undermines the farm base of the Congress in Vidharbha. Indeed, the average loan for the grape growers (outside of Vidharbha) is Rs. 80,000 per acre.

The cut-off date of March 31, 2007 works against even the small group of Vidharbha farmers who do benefit. Loans in the cotton regions are taken between April and June. In the cane growing regions, they are taken between January and March. This means the Vidharbha farmer has one less year of loans waived than the others.
Since no distinction has been made between dryland farmers and others, anomalies abound. West Bengal and even the non-crisis regions of Kerala have large numbers of farmers below the two-hectare limit. With agriculture in bad shape, don't grudge them the windfall the waiver brings. But it is odd the same does not happen for farmers in dryland regions who need it most. What's more, the farmers of Bengal and Kerala have far more access to bank credit than those in Vidharbha do.
The State government itself reckons that Rs. 9,310 crore of the waiver comes to Maharashtra. That is, almost a sixth of the total. Of this, a fraction goes to Vidharbha, the rest being collared by better off farmers. And what of other dryland farmers across the nation? Those in, say, Rayalaseema or Bundelkhand? What do they get?
Is the waiver 'unprecedented'? Each year, nationalised banks write off thousands of crores of rupees as bad debt. Mostly money owed by small numbers of rich businessmen. And theirs is not a 'one-time waiver.' It is a write-off that recurs every year
Between 2000-04, banks wrote off over Rs. 44,000 crores. Mostly, this favoured a tiny number of wealthy people. One 'beneficiary' was a Ketan Parekh group company that saw Rs. 60 crore knocked off. (The Indian Express, May 12, 2005). However, those 'waivers' are done quietly. In 2004, last year of the NDA, such write-offs went up by 16 per cent. Such 'waivers' have not slowed down since 2004.
Staggering giveaway
And all this is apart from the annual Rs. 40,000 crore 'giveaway' to the rich, mainly corporate India. That has been the average in the budget every single year for over a decade. Then there are the straight handouts. No one knows how many thousands of crores are lost by handing out spectrum the way it's being done. But we know it's a staggering amount. Tot up the 'tax holidays,' exemptions and the rest of it and you're looking at sums that make the 'unprecedented' one-time farm loan waiver look like loose change.

But let us look, for instance, at the millions of farmers owning less than one hectare — the largest group. Some 7.2 million of them have accounts in scheduled commercial banks. And the total outstandings against these accounts is Rs. 20,499 crores. (Reserve Bank of India: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2006-07.) As Devidas Tuljapurkar of the All-India Bank Employees Association points out, that's about the same amount the nationalised banking sector writes off each year as bad debt. Mainly for industry. Those farmers with between one and two hectares hold 5.9 million accounts and owe Rs. 20,758 crores. That is: these 13 million account holders owe less than the Rs. 44,000 crore written off by the banks during just the NDA period for a tiny number of rich people.
The waiver does bring great relief to large numbers of farmers. But it is no solution to even the immediate crisis let alone long-term agrarian problems. Nothing in this budget will raise farm incomes. Which means farmers will be back in debt within two years. Their incomes have long been much lower on average than those in other sectors. And they fall further behind each year. Worse, fresh credit will not come cheap. Pleas for 'low-interest or no-interest loans' have been ignored. There is no mention of a price stabilisation fund to shield farmers from the volatility of corporate-rigged global prices. Besides, the idea of a five-year repayment cycle has not been touched. And the highly unjust crop insurance rules that dog regions like Anantapur remain unchanged.
However, there is still a long way to go in the budget session. So these problems can be set right if the government is sincere about helping those worst-hit by the crisis. It could work all these measures into the final document and also adjust the terms for dryland regions.
One funny outcome of the budget is that the media are now talking about farmers. Of course, the 'analysis' of what is 'pro-farmer' comes from the elite. From CEOs, stockbrokers, business editors, corporate lobbyists and touts in three-piece suits. On budget eve one anchor posed a question to his panel in words to this effect: "Will it be a pro-poor,
aam aadmi budget or will Mr. Chidambaram use the opportunity to do something good [for the country] in terms of reforms."
When the budget rolled out, one anchor said: "And now for the budget bad news. India Inc.'s plea for a cut in corporate tax rates went unheeded." Isn't that cute? If a budget is pro-poor, it cannot be good for the country. If it does not give the corporate world more goodies, it is bad. And of course, the elite panellists mostly rued this "gigantic giveaway."
While gasping at the size of the "write-off" it's worth asking why the loan waiver comes up now. Why not in 2005, when the demand was already being made? Or in 2006 when the Prime Minister visited Vidharbha and was shaken by the widespread distress. Mr. Pawar has outsmarted his rivals. Had the step been taken then, the credit would have gone entirely to the Congress. No prizes for guessing who opposed it then (when it would have cost much less).
For three years, while the misery and suicides mounted in Vidharbha, there was not even the admission that a loan waiver was possible. Indeed, it was shot down by those now taking out full page ads claiming credit for it. As they complain in Vidharbha, this is not about karza maafi. It is about seeking voter maafi (voters' forgiveness) in election year.